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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes the innovation strategy of manufacturing firms and examines
the relation between the innovation strategy and important industry-, firm- and
innovation-specific characteristics using Belgian data from the Eurostat Community
Innovation Survey. In addition to important size effects explaining innovation, we find
that high perceived risks and costs and low appropriability of innovations do not
discourage innovation, but rather determine how the innovation sourcing strategy is
chosen.  With respect to the determinants of the decision of the innovative firm to
produce technology itself (Make) or to source technology externally (Buy), we find
that small firms are more likely restrict their innovation strategy to an exclusive make or
buy strategy, while large firms are more likely to combine both internal and external
knowledge acquisition in their innovation strategy. An interesting result that highlights
the complementary nature of the Make and Buy decisions, is that, controlled for firm
size, companies for which internal information is an important source for innovation are
more likely to combine internal and external sources of technology. We find this to be
evidence of the fact that in-house R&D generates the necessary absorptive capacity to
profit from external knowledge acquisition.  Also the effectiveness of different
mechanisms to appropriate the benefits of innovations and the internal organizational
resistance against change are important determinants of the firm’s technology sourcing
strategy.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Faced with increasing international competition, innovation has become a central focus
in firms’ long term strategies. Firms competing in global markets face the challenges
and opportunities of change in markets and technologies. Given the less certain returns,
management of risky sunk R&D expenditures has become even more of overriding
importance for the survival of the firm. One important aspect within innovation
management is the optimal integration of external knowledge, since innovation
increasingly derives from a network of companies interacting in a variety of ways.
The organisation of innovation along the internal versus external sourcing
dimension remains a complex issue.  The theoretical literature, drawing on transaction
costs economics and property rights, considers the choice between external sourcing
and internal development as substitutes: the make or buy decision (Coase, 1937,
Arrow, 1962).  But, certainly at the firm level, there are ample arguments to stress the
complementarity between in-house R&D and external know-how, if only because
internal R&D capabilities allow to effectively “absorb” external knowledge (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990)).  Most of the empirical evidence on the complementary nature of
technology sourcing strategies is anecdotal.
This paper tries to fill this gap by examining the innovation sourcing strategies
using firm level data from the CIS survey of Belgian manufacturing firms. The
empirical model is an extension of the classical studies on determinants of innovations
while including external sourcing. The paper attempts to (a) identify the classic
relationships between innovation and company, technology or market characteristics;
(b) examine the complementary relationship between make or buy decisions pertaining
to technological innovation.  The same set of company, technology and market
characteristics identifying the innovation decision, is used to distinguish the choice
between making and/or buying technology;  and as a side effect ( c) empirically
operationalize the notion of “embodied” and “disembodied” technology acquisition.4
We tackle the question of the firm’s innovative activities and the
complementarity between internal and external technology creation and acquisition in
two steps. In a first step the firms decide whether or not to innovate, while in the
second step the innovating firms decide on how to source information for their
innovation strategy. In addition to the standard explanatory variables like size and
measures of technological opportunity, the model includes variables constructed from
the CIS-questionnaire responses of the firms. These variables relate to constructs such
as protection of innovations, obstacles to innovation activities and information sources
for innovation.
The major focus of the analysis is on the sourcing decision of innovation.  Most
firms in the sample use a combination of both the make and the buy technology
strategies which  exemplifies the need for research into the complementary nature of
these strategies. An interesting result from the analysis is that large firms and firms that
rely on internal information sources for the innovation process are more likely to
combine the make and buy option instead of solely developing innovations in-house.
Our results thus seem to support the absorption capacity view of in-house research.
Appropriability conditions as determined by the effectiveness of different protection
measures also influence the optimal sourcing strategy of the firm. The actual decision to
acquire technology externally, either exclusively or in combination with internal
development, is determined by the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms of
protection of technological innovations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the
literature is briefly reviewed. Section 3 discusses the data and the questionnaire. In
Section 4, the results of our two step analysis are presented. A brief journey into the
choice between “embodied” and “disembodied” technology acquisition is attempted.
We conclude in Section 5, discussing implications and further lines along which to
develop this research.5
II.  LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
The innovation process consists of a complex sequence of decisions. We structure the
decision of a firm on how to innovate as a two step process. First, the firm decides
whether or not to innovate and second, the firm decides which innovation strategy to
develop and how to acquire the necessary technology to accomplish its innovation
goals.
2.1 Who Innovates?
Ample empirical and theoretical studies exists on firm and industry characteristics
influencing firm’s or industry’s innovativeness.  Dating back to Schumpeter's work,
especially the relationship with firm size, market concentration, and technology
characteristics such as appropriability and technological opportunities, has received the
bulk of attention (see Cohen & Levin, 1989 for a review).
(i)Innovation and Size.
The most classical research topic, dating back to Schumpeter, is the relationship
between firm size and innovation. Are there any scale advantages to innovation for
large firms or does innovation rather emerges in small entrepreneurial firms? The
results, are mixed but seem to suggest that the tendency between innovativeness and
size is positive, but not necessarily linear, (see Kamien & Schwartz, 1982;  Cohen &
Levin, 1989 for a review and Evangelista et al. (1997) for recent evidence from Italian
CIS-data). In any case, the size relationship depends on industry characteristics. Acs
and Audretsch (1987) for instance find large enterprises to be more innovative in
sectors with high concentration and barriers to entry, while small firms are more
innovative in sectors with low concentration in newly emerging or growing
technologies.
(ii)Innovation and Industry Characteristics.6
A second, again Schumpeterian, research topic is the relationship with market power.
Expected future market power serves as an incentive to innovate while ex ante market
power generates financial means and reduces risk levels. However ex ante competitive
pressure can be an incentive to innovate and obtain future market power. With no
theoretical clear-cut relationship, the empirical results are ambiguous (e.g. Bozeman &
Link, 1983). An inverted U-shaped relationship, with not too little and not too much
competition in the industry, seems most conductive to innovation (Scherer, 1967). But
also here the relationship is strongly determined by technology characteristics, such as
appropriation conditions.
As already indicated industry/technology characteristics are a critical
determinant of innovative behavior. In many empirical studies, including industry
dummies is important for the explanatory power of the estimated relationship. Several
industry dimensions are of importance here. First there is the scope for future demand,
i.e. the classical Schmookler (1962) hypothesis. Not only the size and growth of the
market matters, but also the willingness to pay for new or improved products. Next
there is the dimension of whether technology exhibits opportunities for innovation.
Scherer (1965) already identified technology classes on the basis of this. Levin and
Reiss (1984) use more specific survey-information to proxy for technological
opportunity such as different sources of information, and links with science. Also
cumulativeness of knowledge can be important: to which extent can current
innovations build further on previous R&D (Breshi, Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996).
Included in here is the role of technology life cycles and emergence of dominant designs
or technology trajectories.
(iii)Innovation and Appropriability.
Finally, the incentives to innovate will depend on the extent to which the results from
innovative activities can be appropriated or easily diffuse within or across industries.
Next to legal mechanisms such as patents or brand names, the firm can strategically
protect its information through secrecy, the complexity of the technology or lead time7
over competitors (Mansfield, 1985). In the literature we find two opposing effects of
low levels of appropriation. On the one hand, a low level of appropriation might lead to
a disincentive effect. Firms reduce their in-house investments in research and
development below the efficient levels because they are unable to appropriate the full
benefit of their investment (Arrow, 1962; Spence , 1984). On the other hand, however,
low levels of appropriability lead to high spillovers between firms. In order to capitalize
on these spillovers, firms need to develop sufficient “absorptive capacity” which implies
more in-house investment in research and development (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990,
Kamien & Zang (1997).
2.2. How do Firms Organize Innovation?
In order to obtain a better understanding of the complementarities and relationships
among firms and institutions, it is important to understand how innovation is induced
by strategies combining internal and external sources.
(i)Sources of Knowledge and Innovation Strategies.
Little is known on complementarities and relationships among firms and other
institutions that may facilitate innovation, as suggested by the literature on national
innovation systems (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1993). Most of
the existing theoretical literature concentrates on the exclusive choice between internal
sourcing and external sourcing of technology. On the combination between internal and
external sourcing the theoretical literature is scarce, while the empirical literature
provides mainly indirect evidence on the importance of the phenomenon (Veugelers,
1997).
----------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
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Table 1 summarizes different potential sources of information for the
innovation process (see also Padmore et al., 1998). Given these information sources,
we can distinguish between the different strategies that can be employed to acquire and
internalize technological knowledge: the firm’s innovation strategy (see Table 2).  A
firm can rely on a combination of three different strategies to engage in innovation.
First, firms can do R&D in-house and develop their own technology, which we see as
the firm’s MAKE decision. A second alternative strategy is to acquire technology
externally, the BUY decision. We identify two alternative buy decisions of the firm. On
the one hand, the firm can acquire new technology which is embodied in an asset that is
acquired such as new personnel or (parts of) other firms or equipment. On the other
hand, the firm can obtain new technology disembodied such as in blue prints through a
licensing agreement or by outsourcing the technology from an R&D contractor or
consulting agency. A third, more hybrid form of obtaining and developing new
technology is through cooperative agreements between firms or other research
institutions. A final sourcing strategy is to absorb existing technology without any
explicit involvement from the innovator. Freely available information or involuntary
spillovers from innovators can be used by companies in their innovation process (see
Table 1). Only the latter strategy will be impossible to distinguish in our sample.
------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
------------------------------------
(ii)Make or Buy: Theory and Hypotheses.
The theoretical literature that exists on this relation stresses the choice between external
sourcing and internal development as substitutes, i.e. the classical MAKE or BUY
decision. Building further on the general literature on make or buy decisions, i.e.
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) and property rights theory (Grossman
& Hart, 1986), the theoretical framework to explain R&D outsourcing stresses the9
advantage of tapping existing often more specialized knowledge if available. This leads
to time gains and lower innovation costs to the extent that economies of scale in R&D
can be more efficiently exploited. However technology outsourcing may create
considerable transaction costs, ex ante in terms of search and negotiation costs and ex
post to execute and enforce the contract. Typically, costs are incurred because of a
control loss on technological leakage or due to supplier opportunism. The hold-up
problem results in underinvestment of the supplier, where the latter has too little
incentives to make specific investments whose rents can be appropriated by the buyer.
Next to asset specificity, the typical uncertain and complex nature of R&D projects
exacerbates these problems. Hence, R&D contracting is more likely to occur for
generic, non-firm specific R&D that allows for specialization advantages, such as
routine research tasks like materials testing, and process rather than product
innovations (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). In addition we expect external technology
sourcing when the appropriation regime is tight as it is in the pharmaceuticals industry
(Teece, 1986) and when assets complementary to the technology are in competitive
supply such that the small numbers bargaining hazards are minimized (Pisano, 1990).
Rather than trying to save on contracting costs by internal sourcing, the agency
literature suggests as a solution a careful design of control and incentive mechanisms.
Instead of a hierarchical governance structure, more hybrid type of contracts that leave
enough property rights to the seller, may mitigate the typical negative effect of control
on incentives (Ulset, 1996). One such alternative governance structure is a more
cooperative type of agreement. While cooperative R&D allows for sharing of costs and
risks, the exploitation of synergies from complementarities between partners, and
provides access to external technologies and in some cases governmental support, it
may also be less vulnerable to transaction costs as compared to contracting. It not only
allows for a better control of technology transfers and internalization of spillover
effects, but also the inherent reciprocity relationship between complementary partners
minimizes opportunism. However, information asymmetries and the uncertain nature of
R&D may also in this case endanger the exploitation of cooperative benefits. But rather10
than turn to contracts to minimize the incentives for opportunism in cooperation, firms
can select partners where reputation matters more and where complementary is
maximized (Gulati, 1995). Maintaining in-house R&D activities remains important to
secure the firm’s bargaining position and efficiently absorb results from collaborative
ventures (Contractor, 1983; Gans & Stern, 1997). This leads to suggest a
complementarity between make and cooperation.
Instead of discussing make or buy or cooperate as substitutes, the potential for
combining internal and external sourcing modes as complementary innovation
strategies should not be ignored. Although one strategy may substitute for the other,
typically at the project level, combining internal and external sourcing creates extensive
scope for complementarities, certainly at the firm level. In-house R&D may serve to
modify and improve external technology acquisitions, at least if the in-house
organizational structure exhibits a willingness to absorb and overcome the “Not-
Invented-Here” syndrome. (Harrigan, 1985; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).
While examining the critical success factors of 40 innovations, Freeman (1991)
found external sources of technical expertise combined with in-house basic research
that facilitate these external linkages to be crucial in explaining success of the
innovation. Hence implying a strong complementary relation between in-house
knowledge development and external knowledge acquisition. Similarly, firms
performing in-house research would be the ones to draw most heavily upon the
cooperative research associations set up after world war I in the UK. These research
associations were intended to assist firms in technical matters and the expectation was
that firms without any internal research facilities would draw most heavily upon these
research associations. However, the research associations served as an important
complementary source of scientific and technical information for firms performing in-
house R&D. Additional evidence of this complementary relation comes from examining
the payment streams for licenses where the flows are primarily between firms
performing in-house R&D and not from firms that lack any in-house R&D capabilities
to firms that have strong in-house R&D programs.11
Following the literature, large firms can be expected to be less likely to buy to
the extent that scale advantages in R&D can be realized in-house. But to the extent that
large firms have own in-house R&D with better absorptive capacities, they are better
tuned to benefit from external sourcing (see Gambardella, 1992 and Henderson &
Cockburn, 1996 for evidence on this from the pharmaceuticals industry). The specific
problems that small and middle sized firms encounter in establishing external linkages
are discussed in Rothwell and Dodgson (1991). Pisano (1990), however, found that
bio-tech companies with more R&D experience rely more on internal sourcing. This
result is explained by the author in a behavioral-theory-of-the-firm framework where
bounded rationality prevents firms from making the necessary adjustment and continue
to behave according to routines developed in the past.
1
Teece (1986) stresses the importance of the appropriability regime in the choice
of governance structures. When appropriability is high, firms are willing to develop
technology internally and to sell their technology to other firms to appropriate the
benefits from innovating. Hence, firms that decide to acquire technology externally, are
more likely to acquire this technology in disembodied form such as through licensing
agreements or R&D contracts. If internal and external technology sourcing strategies
are complementary, we expect to observe the combination more when innovations are
easier to appropriate. High spillover environments quickly erode a firm’s technological
advantage. In that case firms will develop specialized complementary assets internally
to protect their technology and firms that decide to acquire technology externally,
acquire this technology in embodied form through the acquisition of other firms or by
attracting specialized personnel.
There exists little explicit theory on the determinants of embodied or
disembodied technology acquisition. But one could still hypothesize that if legal
protection of innovations is tight, firms are more likely to be able to obtain technology
in disembodied form in arms-length transactions. If innovations are easier to protect
                                                       
1 However, Arora & Gambardella (1990) found larger bio-tech firms to be more active12
through strategic measures such as secrecy, lead time, or complexity of the product or
process, firms are more likely to find technology tied to complementary assets and
acquire technology in embodied form. With little theory to guide empirical testing, the
results presented here are a first step, intended to stimulate discussion and further
research into these determinants.
III. SAMPLE
The survey data used in the empirical analysis allow us to include many of the
dimensions identified in the theoretical literature as critical to explain the firm’s decision
to innovate or not and when innovating, to make and/or buy technology  Not only firm
size and technological origin but also appropriation conditions, organisational attitude,
and internal R&D capabilities can be proxied.
The data used for this research are innovation data on the Belgian
manufacturing industry that were collected as part of the Community Innovation
Survey conducted by Eurostat in the different member countries in 1993. The survey
intended to develop insights into the problems of technological innovation in the
manufacturing industry and was the first of its sort organized in many of the
participating countries. A representative sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing firms
was selected and a 13-page questionnaire sent out to them. The response rate was
higher than 50% (748). The researchers in charge of collecting the data also performed
a limited non-response analysis and concluded that no systematic bias could be detected
(Debackere & Fleurent, 1995).
The sample is detailed in Figure 1. In the first branch of Figure 1, firms that
innovate are distinguished from those who do not innovate based on their answer on
the question whether they innovated in the last two years AND returned a positive
amount spent on innovation: 60% of the firms in the sample claim to innovate, while
only 40% does not.  This number is in line with the survey results from other EC
                                                                                                                                                       
in external sourcing.13
countries: an average 50% of all EC companies described themselves as innovative
(Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 1996-2).
Next we distinguish how firms acquire and develop new technology: the make
or buy decision. Given a lack of available data at the project level, the choice between
make and/or buy is studied at the firm level.  On the one hand firms that develop their
own technology can do this in-house through own R&D spending. On the other hand
the firms can acquire technology through external means. With the exception of the
involuntary spillover strategy, different external sourcing strategies could be identified.
In order to reduce the number of categories of external technology acquisition, we
grouped the different strategies either as “disembodied” technology acquisition or as
“embodied” technology acquisition. In the former case, the asset acquired is the
technology itself such as in licensing agreements, R&D contracting, or consulting
services. In the latter case the technology is embodied in the good or asset acquired,
such as new personnel or (part of) other firms.  We ignored the “embodied” purchase
of equipment, mainly because too many firms responded positively on this item. 
2
Probably not all of them interpreted the question as buying equipment with the explicit
purpose of obtaining new technologies and as an alternative to developing the
technology internally (see also Evangelista et al, 1997).  For a complete description of
the variables, see Appendix.
Identification of the presence of an innovation strategy and whether this
innovation strategy includes make, buy or cooperate, is based only on the extent to




Insert Figure 1 about here
                                                       
2  The infra reported results are not affected by the inclusion or not of purchase of
equipment in the buy option.
3  Not relying on budgets is also beneficial with respect to a small firm sample bias, (see
Kleinknecht, 1987).14
-------------------------------------
In the sample most of the innovating firms both make and buy technology
(73%) while 17% only makes its technology in-house and the remaining 10% only
buys. This result demonstrates the importance of linkages between internal and external
sourcing or a complementarity between the make and buy decision of the firm. This
complementarity is even more apparent between Make and Cooperate.  We never
observe firms cooperating while not performing any in-house R&D, which partly
follows from the definition of cooperation in the survey.
4 If the firm is observed to
cooperate actively, it implies that this firm spends on R&D internally. Given this joint
occurrence, we will concentrate the external sourcing decision in the empirical analysis
on the Buy options of the firm. The cooperate option is more fully analyzed in a
companion paper (Cassiman & Veugelers, 1998).
When buying technologies, exclusively or in combination with making
technologies, firms mostly combine disembodied and embodied purchases, especially
when combining with own R&D and cooperation. Exclusive disembodied purchase of
equipment, most frequently discussed in theoretical modeling, is in the dataset almost
ignorable, at least at the firm level.
The following Table reports the more disaggregated external technology
acquisition data for the sample. It is especially interesting to note that firms that also
develop their own technology (make) are more likely to rely on external R&D
contracts. This is again an indication that these relations are complementary: internal
technology development increases the value of any externally acquired technology,
especially when this technology is disembodied and needs to be assimilated by the
organization to exploit its value.
--------------------------------
                                                       
4 The questionnaire explicitly described cooperation as an active participation of the
firm in the project.15
Insert Table 3 about here
--------------------------------
The importance of firm size can be appreciated by looking at the following
Table 4. Large firms are more likely to innovate. Of the firms with less than 50
employees, only 37% innovate compared to 60% of the firms in the whole sample (see
also Evangelista et al., 1998, for comparable results). Small firms that are innovative
are more likely to restrict themselves to a simple innovation strategy. Of the firms only
developing technology in-house, 76% have less than 250 employees, while 74% of the
firms that only source technology externally have less than 250 employees. Large firms,
with a broader set of innovation projects, use more a combination of sourcing
strategies. Note however that we still need to control for industry and technology
characteristics in a multivariate analysis to establish a more robust result.
--------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
--------------------------------
Besides characterizing the innovative strategies of the companies along the
make-buy dimension, the questionnaire also allows to assess other important
dimensions of the innovation process. The respondents were asked to rate the
importance to their innovation strategy of different information sources for the
innovation process, goals for innovation, protection of innovations and obstacles to
innovation. Firms had to rate their answer on a 5-point Likert scale (from unimportant
(1) to crucial (5)). In order to manage the answers on these many questions, we
aggregated the answers by summing the scores on related variables and rescaled the
total scores to a number between 0 and 1 for comparability. For an overview of the
questions and categories selected, see Appendix. Firms that did not perform any
innovative activity were also asked to answer the questions on firm characteristics
(sales, personnel, ...) and the questions on the obstacles to innovation.16
IV.  METHOD AND RESULTS
We estimated several alternative models, but only report the results of the most
representative ones. The results discussed here are the ones that remained significant
under any of the alternative specifications.
5 The independent variables used in all the
models are detailed in the Appendix.
4.1. Innovation Decision.
In this section we study the innovation decision of the manufacturing firms in the
sample in a multi-variate analysis. Given that both innovating and non-innovating firms
responded to some parts of the questionnaire, we can attempt to discriminate between
innovators and non-innovators in the sample. We use a Logit model where the
dependent variable is 1 when the firm claims to innovate (and specified a positive
innovation budget).
The results of the estimation are presented in the following Tables. The high
Chi-squared of the model indicates the high joint explanatory power of the independent
variables.
--------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here
--------------------------------
The coefficients in Table 5 are the estimated partial derivatives of probabilities
with respect to the vector of characteristics. They are computed at the means of the
independent variables. The coefficient tells us how much the probability that the firm
innovates increases with an increase in that independent variable, holding the other
independent variables constant. The signs of most of the coefficients are as expected.
Large firms (more than 500 employees) are more likely to innovate (SizeL). For small
firms (less than 50 employees) (SizeS) we find that the probability of being an17
innovating firm is lower.  Both size coefficients are significant, indicating a non-linearity
in the size relationship.
Interesting is the highly significant coefficient of the export intensity of the firms
(Expint). All else equal, a firm that exports 10% more of its production has a 3.74%
higher probability of being an innovating firm. Competitive pressures in the
international markets could account for the fact that constant innovation is the only way
to hold on to international market share. Somewhat counter intuitive at first sight, we
find that firms that find high risks and high costs an obstacle to innovation, are actually
more likely to innovate (OBSTcost). Put differently, high risks and costs of innovation
do not deter firms from innovating, on the contrary it seems. This result suggests that
this variable seems to capture awareness to obstacles rather than effectiveness in
blocking innovative purposes. This observation will be important in understanding how
firms actually organize their innovation strategy (see below). The lack of technological
information (OBSTinfo) seems to have a similar effect on the innovation decision. Lack
of opportunities to innovate (OBSTlack) has the expected sign, but does not show up
significant in the decision whether or not to innovate. More important in the decision to
innovate is the perception of a need for innovation (OBSTneed), whether a low
willingness to pay for innovations of the customers or the fact that the firm is still
profiting from previous innovations. This variable has the expected negative effect on
the decision to innovate.
Resistance against externally induced change (OBSTresist) has the expected
effect on the decision to innovate, limiting the ability of firms to engage in innovative
activities. However, we do expect that companies that have a high resistance against
change but innovate nevertheless, will also use different sourcing strategies.
The expected effect of low appropriability of innovation benefits was
ambiguous (OBSTimit). On the one hand high spillovers discourage investments in
                                                                                                                                                       
5 The alternative models relate to which control variables to include, how to define and
group the independent variables, whether to include interaction terms.  Results are
available from the authors upon request.18
research and development. On the other hand, these spillovers might be complements
to in-house R&D and actually stimulate innovation. The regression results, with a
significantly positive coefficient, seem to support the absorptive capacity of spillovers
and reject the disincentive effect.  Given that spillovers seem to stimulate innovation,
we should also expect appropriability conditions to affect the type of innovation
strategy used (see below).
The typical high-tech industries, especially Chemicals and Electric(onic)s, have
the expected positive coefficients and are highly significant. The traditionally low-tech
sectors, like textiles, wood & paper are not significant.  This result is in line with most
other studies which found strong industry effects.  Here industry dummies proxy for
demand and supply conditions within the industry. Including these proxies, such as
concentration, technological opportunities and appropriation at the industry level,
rather than the industry dummies, did not improve the results of the simple industry
dummies.  In any case, these variations to the basic model seem to suggest that the
inclusion of industry variables does not seem to influence the effects of company
characteristics.
Given the discontinuous nature of the size variables (SizeS and SizeL), it is
interesting to look at the marginal effects for the two values of these variables. The
results are summarized in Table 6 where a split regression was performed for both
values of SizeS and SizeL. As expected, the marginal effects of the other independent
variables are much more pronounced in explaining innovation for the small firms
(SizeS). Export intensity is much more important in explaining innovation by small
firms than it is for larger firms. Also the industry dummies increase in importance in
explaining innovation of small firms. This is an indication that the innovativeness of
small firms depends on the industry characteristics, something that Acs & Audretsch
(1987) also found. It might also explain the negative coefficient for the small sized19
firms, if the random sample contains relatively more small firms in low tech sectors.
6
The explanatory power of the independent variables other then size is rather limited for
the large firms (larger than 50 employees), and a fortiori for the biggest firms (larger
than 500, SizeL).
--------------------------------
Insert Table 8 about here
--------------------------------
An alternative measure of goodness of fit for the Logit models compares the
frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes. The predicted outcome is the one that
has maximum probability. The model predicts 77% correctly (565 of 734 ). A naive
model would predict 439 out of 734 correctly or only 60%. Our model thus has some
predictive power beyond a naive guess. Next we restrict the sample to the firms that do
innovate and analyze how they organize their innovative activities along the make
versus buy decision.
4.2. Technology Make or Buy Decision
We consider three choices of how the firm can organize its innovation. First firms can
develop new technology themselves: the Make decision. Second, the firms can rely on
external sources for their technology, or can Buy the technology. This category
includes licensing agreements, external R&D contracts, consulting agencies, acquiring
firms or parts of firms, or attracting qualified personnel. The third possibility, of course,
is that the firms use both the Make and Buy strategies. The buy & cooperate strategy
is never observed since cooperate is always associated with make. Since we choose not
focus on the cooperate option, we drop the 38 observations from the companies that
make & cooperate, but did not buy.  These firms could not be included in the exclusive
                                                       
6 Of the 320 small firms, only 22 are in the chemical sector and 12 in the electrical
sector.20
make, nor in the combination of make & buy. The make & buy option includes both
those who do and do not cooperate.  We tested on a subset of the sample with firms
that make and/or buy for differences between those who do and do not cooperate, but
found no important differences. In addition we need to drop 38 observations due to
missing values on some of the independent variables.
As we saw before, the combination of make and buy is the most prevalent case
(283 out of 401 observations).  While this high number is not so surprising at the firm
level, what remains interesting to examine is which firm and industry characteristics
significantly facilitate the choice for this combination.
We estimate a multinomial logit model with three choices: make only, buy only,
and, make and buy. The joint explanatory power of the independent variables is again
high given the high Chi-squared value for the estimated model. When there are more
than two outcomes for the dependent variable, it is more useful to look at the marginal
effects of the independent variables on the probability of each of the choices. The
following Table presents the results for the full model.
---------------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here
---------------------------------------
As suggested by the literature, larger firms are more likely to both make and
buy technology while small firms are more likely to source technology externally
(SizeS, SizeL). Small firms cannot generate the same economies of scale as larger firms
when performing research internally. As a result they restrict themselves to acquiring
technology externally and are less likely to choose for the combination strategy.
The results of the regression seem to support the absorption capacity
hypothesis of in-house research and development, where firms that generate more
useful information internally (INFOint) are more likely to combine the internal and
external sourcing strategies.  In order for firms to take advantage of any externally
acquired technology they need to perform some internal research to facilitate a smooth21
assimilation of the technology.  This positive effect of internal sourcing emphasizes the
absorptive capacity idea since it prevails even when controlled for firm size.
Resistance against externally induced change (OBSTresist) may capture the
effect of the “Not-Invented-Here” syndrome. Firms that experience this syndrome are
clearly less likely to rely on an external sourcing strategy. Tthe data agree that within
manufacturing this is an significant determinant of a firm’s innovation strategy, reducing
the probability of exclusive external sourcing.
The effect of low appropriability is captured by four variables: OBSTimit,
PROTlegal, PROTstrat and PROTtime. A high score on OBSTimit indicates that the
firm believes that imitation of innovations is relatively easy. A high score on PROT-
variables relates to the beliefs of the firm about how effective legal or strategic
protection or protection through lead-time on competitors is. A high score implies high
(awareness of) appropriability. The only variables that are significant are PROTlegal
and PROTtime. Both variables indicate that if appropriability is strong or if firms are
more aware of the importance of appropriation, they are less likely to opt for an
exclusive external sourcing strategy.  The significance of legal protection might be a
result of two effects. First when legal protection of technology is effective, more firms
are willing to develop this technology internally and then transfer this technology while
extracting some rents. Secondly, given the complementary nature of in-house R&D, the
acquiring firm needs to perform some internal development to integrate this new
technology. Thus combining the make and buy strategy is more efficient, relative to
exclusive make or buy. In order to appropriate the benefits of innovation through lead-
time on competitors, the firms avoid exclusive external sourcing.
Firms who consider costs and risks as important obstacles to innovation
(OBSTcost), try to combine developing the technology and acquiring some parts
externally to either strategy alone. Firms thus try to overcome this obstacle by
combining internal and external sourcing. This is a partial explanation for the fact that
we found that high costs and risk of innovating do not discourage innovation by the
firms per se, but rather determines how these firms set up their innovation strategy.22
An interesting result is the highly significant coefficient of INFOcomp. If
competitors are an important source of information for the innovation process, firms
are more likely to source knowledge externally. In particular, firms are more likely to
only innovate through a Buy strategy. External knowledge acquisition strategies by
competitors are easier to observe and imitate than internal development efforts. Which
external technology sourcing strategies competitors use could be important information
for the firm’s own innovation activities. As a result we expect this variable to have a
positive effect on the external acquisition strategies of the firm.
The industry dummies indicate that firms in the chemical sector and the
electrical equipment sector, as innovation intense sectors, are unlikely to rely solely on
an external innovation strategy. These high tech sectors are more likely to be able to
take advantage of complementarities between internal and external technology sources.
Other variables relating to technological opportunities within the industry were not
significant. Our estimates were not sensitive to dropping these variables from the model
(see Table A1 in the Appendix).
Although the model has high explanatory power, the goodness of fit when
tabulating actual against predicted values underpredicts the make only and buy only
decisions considerably. A naive model would assign all the observations to the Make
and Buy category. This would result in 73% correct predictions (264 out of 363). The
model as presented increases the predictive power to 77%. Nevertheless the significant
coefficients in the model estimation are interesting for identifying which variables are
important in the organization of the firm’s innovation strategy. Next we analyze the
external technology sourcing decisions of the firms in our sample and provide some
determinants of the organization of technology transfer between organizations.
External Technology Sources: Embodied or Disembodied Technology Acquisition
We can classify technology acquisition in two broad categories. First the organization
can acquire new technology that has to be assimilated by the organization. In that case
we say that the technology is disembodied. Disembodied technology acquisition23
strategies include licensing, R&D contracting and the use of technology consulting
agencies. Second, new technology can be acquired that is embodied in the good or
asset that is acquired. We call this embodied technology acquisition. Such strategies
include acquisition of firms or attracting qualified personnel. To analyze the different
ways that firms can structure their external innovation activities, we restrict the sample
to all those firms that are actually engaged in external technology acquisition and
classify them as organized to acquire technology embodied, disembodied or both.
Again, only information on the actual use of different modes is used,  information on
budget is ignored. There exists very little theory to formulate hypotheses on the
variables that influence the decision of the firm to opt for embodied or disembodied
technology. The results reported here should therefore be interpreted as predictions
useful for further elaborations.
7
The coefficients of the variables in the estimated model are again jointly very
significant. Table 8 presents the marginal effects of the independent variables on the
probability of the respective choices.
----------------------------------
Insert Table 8 about here
----------------------------------
Larger firms are less likely to acquire embodied technology while small firms
are more likely to acquire embodied technology (SizeS, SizeL). Smaller firms that do
acquire technology externally are more likely to accomplish this through taking over
relevant parts of other firms or attracting specialized personnel instead of assimilating
disembodied technology, for which they lack the required absorptive capacity to fully
capitalize on this disembodied technology.  It is also consistent with the idea that small
firm’s knowledge is more “tacit” (cf Nooteboom, 1994).
An important determinant of the decision to acquire technology in embodied or
disembodied form is the type of protection that is available. When the firm gets better
                                                       
7 Again due to missing values, the sample is reduced from 326 observation to 303.24
protection from secrecy, lead time or complexity, it is less likely to acquire disembodied
technology (PROTstrat). If on the other hand legal protection is tight (PROTlegal), the
firms that acquire technology externally are more likely to acquire it in disembodied
form. Again if legal protection is tight, more firms offer technology licenses or it is
easier to write specific contracts for the delivery of technology. If strategic protection is
tight however, firms offering technology try to appropriate any rents through
embodying the technology within complementary, but harder to replicate assets.
When innovation costs and risks are perceived to be high, the firm is less likely
to acquire disembodied technology (OBSTcost). Here again the perceived costs and
risks of innovation influences the innovation strategy of the firms.
An important variable related to the complementarity of internal and external
innovation activities is whether or not the firms develop knowledge internally (Make).
In-house development of technology clearly enhances the ability of the firm to realize
benefits from disembodied technology acquisition. The result that in-house
development and disembodied technology acquisition are strongly related, while the
relation with embodied technology acquisition is the opposite, is interesting food for
thought on the question of the complementarity between internal and external
knowledge acquisition strategies.
We can again check the choices predicted by the model against the actual
choices in order to get an idea of the predictive power of the model. The naive model
would classify all observations as combining the embodied and disembodied technology
strategies. This model would predict 130 out of 303 correctly (43%). Our model
increases the predictive power to 50%.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The relationship between external linkages and in-house R&D activities, remains a
complex issue. The literature that exists on this stresses the choice between external25
sourcing and internal development as substitutes, i.e. the classical MAKE or BUY
decision drawing on transaction costs economics and property rights. But, although the
availability of external technology may discourage —and hence substitute for— own
research investment by the receiver firms, there are also arguments to stress the
complementarity between in-house R&D and external know-how, i.e. the MAKE and
BUY decision, certainly at the firm level. Own in-house R&D activities are often found
to reduce some of the inefficiencies and problems associated with external acquisition,
if only because it allows to modify and improve external acquisition. This requires
however suitable internal structures to effectively absorb the externally acquired
technology and overcoming the “Not-Invented-Here” syndrome.
We tackle the empirical question of the firm’s innovative activities and the
complementarity between internal and external technology acquisition in two steps. In a
first part we analyze the determinants that distinguish innovating firms from non-
innovating firms. In addition to the standard explanatory variables like size and
measures of technological opportunity, the empirical model includes variables
constructed from questionnaire responses of the firms. An interesting result is that the
absence of a need to innovate, due to disinterest by customers or as a result of previous
innovations, is an important determinant of the non-innovative character of firms. On
the other hand, high perceived risks and costs of innovation and low appropriability of
results do not necessarily discourage innovation, but rather determine how innovation is
organized. Also size is very important in explaining innovative activities, where
especially the biggest firms have the highest likelihood of innovating.
The focus of the second step in the analysis is on the sourcing decision for
innovative firms. In this section we single out the determinants of the decision of the
firm to develop technology by itself (Make decision) and/or to source externally (Buy
decision).  Most firms use a combination of both the make and the buy technology
strategies, although small firms have a higher probability of using an exclusive make or
buy strategy and are less likely to combine these technology sourcing strategies. Large
firms are more likely to combine both the make and buy options.  Controlling for firm26
size, companies relying on internal information sources for the innovation process are
more likely to combine the make and buy option. Our results thus seem to support the
absorption capacity view of in-house research. The actual decision to acquire
technology externally, either exclusively or in combination with internal development, is
further determined by the effectiveness of different mechanisms of protection of
technology. Strong legal protection or appropriability through lead-time on competitors
lead the firms to reduce the probability of an exclusive external knowledge sourcing
strategy. Internal organizational resistance against externally induced change will also
lead to less exclusive external technology sourcing.
In the future we hope to further strengthen these results. First, a panel data set
would allow us to eliminate the firm specific fixed effects which might be driving these
results. Second, an important dimension of evaluating alternative organizational
structures is assessing, next to participition in innovation, also the intensity of use and
their technological performance.  Maybe small firms use less combinatory strategies,
but when they do so, they could use it more intensively and productively (see e.g.
Bound et al. 1984, for evidence on size differences in the productivity of innovative
strategies ).  In order to test this, good performance measures for technological
innovation need to be constructed.  Third, the fact that we only have information on the
firm’s innovation strategy but no information about the project level limits the
conclusions we can draw about the complementarity of the make and buy innovation
strategies. Ideally the analysis should be complemented with information on the
strategy employed to accomplish a specific project and whether the firm developed
parts of the technology in-house while outsourcing other elements, or whether it
restricted itself to a strategy of in-house development or external sourcing. Given some
case evidence, we feel confident that even at the project level we will observe a strong
complementarity between the technology sourcing strategies.
Finally we can compare the results for the Belgian case against those for other
countries that have participated in the Community Innovation Survey. Divergence in
results could be due to different firm populations or industry structure, but more27
interestingly they could also be due to differences in the innovation policies within these
countries and regions. This would allow us to formulate some policy recommendations
to stimulate innovation within lagging sectors and/or regions and improve existing
innovation policies.28
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INNOV INNOV=1 if firm developed or introduced new or
improved products or processes in the last 2 years
AND reported a positive budget for innovation
expenditures
MAKE MAKE=1 if firm does R&D AND reports a non-
negative R&D budget
BUY BUY=1 if  firm acquired technology through licensing
and/or through R&D contracting and/or through
consultancy services and/or purchase of another
enterprise and/or hiring skilled employees.
EMBODIED EMBODIED=1 if  firm acquired technology through
purchase of another enterprise and/or hiring skilled
employees.
DISEMBODIED DISEMBODIED=1 if  firm acquired technology
through licensing and/or through R&D contracting
and/or through consultancy services.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Firm Specific Variables
SizeS SizeS = 1 if the firm has less than 50 employees
SizeL SizeL = 1 if the firm has more than 500 employees
Expint Export intensity = Sales from Exports / total Sales
INFOint * Importance of Internal Information Sources of the firm
for Innovation
information within the company
information within the group
INFOcomp * Importance of close Competitors as Information
Sources of the firm for Innovation
INFOscience * Importance of scientific Information Sources
information from Universities
information from Public Research Institutes
information from Technical Institutes






lowering set up time
lessen environmental effects
improve work environment and/or on the job security
GOALqual * Importance of Quality Improvement Goal of the firm
increase product quality
replace older products
PROTtime * Importance of Lead Time on Competitors as a
Protection Mechanism for product and process
innovations of the firm
PROTlegal * Importance of Legal Protection Mechanisms for
product and process innovations of the firm
patent protection
registration (brands, copy rights,...)33
PROTstrat * Importance of Strategic Protection Mechanisms for
product and process innovations of the firm
secrecy
complexity of product or process design
OBSTcost * Importance of Cost and Risk Obstacle for innovation
by the firm
risks too high
no suitable financing available
high costs of innovation
pay-back period too long
innovation cost hard to control
uncertainty about introduction times
OBSTlack * Importance of Lack of Opportunities for Innovation as
an Obstacle to innovation by the firm
lack of external technical services
few opportunities for cooperation
lack of technological opportunities
OBSTneed * Importance of No Need for Innovation as an Obstacle
to innovation by the firm
no need for innovation because of earlier innovations
little interest for innovations by customers
OBSTinfo * Importance of Lack of Information for Innovation as
an Obstacle to innovation by the firm
lack of qualified personnel
lack of personnel to innovate
lack of information on technology
lack of market information
OBSTresist * Importance of Resistance against change within the
firm as an Obstacle to innovation by the firm
OBSTimit * Importance of ease of Imitation of Innovations as an
Obstacle to innovation by the firm
Industry Specific Variables
TWP TWP = 1 if firm is in Textile, Wood or Paper Industry
(typically the Low Tech industries)
(NACE Codes: 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22)
Electrical Electrical = 1 if firm is in Electrical Equipment
Industry (NACE Codes: 30, 31, 32, 33)
Food Food = 1 if firm is in Food Business
(NACE Codes: 15, 16)
Chemical Chemical = 1 if firm is in Chemical Sector
(NACE Codes: 24, 25)
M&M M&M = 1 if firm is in Metals and Manufacturing
(NACE Codes: 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35)
C4 4-firm concentration ratio of the industry at NACE 2
level
* The variables indicated with * are based on questionnaire questions where firms had to rate on a Likert-scale from
1: unimportant to 5: crucial for innovation activities.  In case more than one question was used to construct the
variable the composing item are indicated in italics.34
Tables
Table 1: Information Sources for Innovation
Internal Information Sources information within the company
information within the group
External Information Sources
• From other Firms information from suppliers raw materials/components
information from equipment suppliers
information from customers
information from close competitors
• Scientific Information information from Universities
information from Public Research Institutes
information from Technical Institutes
• Freely Available Information patent information
specialized conferences, meetings, publications
trade conferences, seminars
Table 2: Innovation Strategies
• Make (develop technology in-house)
• Buy (source technology externally)
Embodied in
- Personnel







Table 3: External Technology Sourcing
External Technology Source BUY
 a MAKE and BUY
 a
Licensing 18 (41%) 122 (43%)
R&D Contracts 7 (16%) 145 (51%)
Consulting Agencies 13 (30%) 94 (33%)
Take Over 10 (23%) 67 (24%)
Qualified Personnel 26 (60%) 164 (58%)
Total Firms 43 (100%) 283 (100%)
a: % do not sum to 100 because firms can use several external sources simultaneously.35
Table 4: Innovation Strategy and Firm Size
Size No
Innovation
Innovation Make Buy Make and Buy
< 50 employees 203 117 32 28 48
50-250 employees 62 114 25 4 80
250-500 employees 21 95 12 6 66
> 500 employees 9 113 6 5 89
Total Firms 295 439 75 43 28336
Table 5
Firm’s Decision to Innovate (1) or Not (0)
Number of observations 734
Log likelihood function -338.07
Restricted log likelihood -494.55
Chi-squared 312.96
***





























*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1.
Table 6: Marginal Effects for of Size




















































*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1.37
Table 7: Decision to Source Technology Internal or External
Number of observations 363
Log likelihood function -221.1
Restricted log likelihood -287.13
Chi-squared 132.07
***
























































































































































*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1.
Standard Errors in brackets.
Probabilities at the mean vector are 0=0.144 1=0.033 2=0.823.38
Table 8: Embodied or Disembodied External Technology Sourcing
Number of observations 303
Log likelihood function -294.65
Restricted log likelihood -322.44
Chi-squared 55.59
***



























































*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1.
Standard Errors are between brackets.
Probabilities at the mean vector are 0=0.181 1=0.359 2=0.461.39
Table A1: Decision to Source Technology Internal or External, Best Fit
Number of observations 363
Log likelihood function -221.1
Restricted log likelihood -287.13
Chi-squared 132.07
***

























































































































*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1.
Standard Errors in brackets.
Probabilities at the mean vector are 0=0.148 1=0.034 2=0.819.40
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Figure 1: Innovation Strategies